By Joseph J. Kockelmans (Editor)
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Extra info for A Companion to Martin Heidegger's "Being and time"
Thus, Kant had hoped to put metaphysics on the ‘secure path of a science’,⁴⁹ and bring an end to its hopeless controversies by basing its knowledge claims around the necessary conditions for experience or thought rather than being tout court;⁵⁰ but in fact, as subsequent disputes show (concerning what Kant has and has not established in the Analogies, for example), debates about the former turn out to be no less intractable than the latter. We therefore seem to have no particularly compelling reason to take a Kantian route into engaging in metaphysics by going via an inquiry into the structure of our thought and experience, if it is still the case that ultimately our destination is to engage in ontology—for it seems from what has been said so far, that we have just as much chance of success with this if we begin with speculation into being qua being at the outset.
A Polemic’, Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain, 32 (Autum/Winter 1995), 1–13. How is Hegelian Metaphysics Possible? 31 It may seem that it is one thing for Hegel to make the fundamental nature of the world around us into an object of his investigation, and so to conduct an inquiry into ‘being qua being’; but it is quite another to claim to make ‘the absolute’ into such an object, where the latter project seems to be more powerfully at odds with Kantian strictures concerning rationalistic metaphysic, as Kant may have appeared to put such transcendent entities beyond our knowledge in a much more radical way.
I explore the way in which that Schellingian critique was transmitted into the British context by ﬁgures such as Andrew Seth, where that critique led Bradley and McTaggart to question the assumption that idealism must involve the deduction of being from thought; instead, I argue, McTaggart in particular put forward a theory of categories which cast doubt on the need for any such deduction, as no fundamental question is left unanswered without it. In one sense, this remains a metaphysical reading of Hegel, because the category theory in question is not merely transcendental and concerned with our conceptual scheme;⁸⁶ but in other respects it is more modest than traditionally ⁸⁴ Hegel, EPR, 20 [Werke, VII: 24].